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Abstract
We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on local
and international tax competition in Economics. On the
basis of this survey, we discuss whether EU countries should
harmonise tax policies to prevent a race to the bottom.
Much of the evidence suggests that tax competition does
not lead to significant reductions in tax revenues. Therefore,
we conclude that tax coordination is in all likelihood unnec-
essary to prevent inefficiently low levels of taxation in the
EU. But since the evidence against the adverse effects of tax
competition is not unambiguous, we also discuss whether
intergovernmental transfers might be a less invasive means
than outright tax harmonisation to prevent a race to the
bottom.
Keywords: tax competition, tax coordination, European
Union, fiscal federalism
1 Introduction
One of the professed goals of the European Union (EU)
is to create an ever closer union. In the last few decades,
European governments have made considerable prog-
ress in pursuing this goal. They have established a free
trade zone, a common currency and harmonised educa-
tional and vocational standards. One area, however,
where harmonisation is markedly absent is tax policy.
The lack of harmonisation is not due to inaction by
European institutions. The EU Commission, for exam-
ple, has launched several initiatives for tax coordination
over the years, the most recent one being the establish-
ment of an EU-level Tax Policy Group.1 Yet, member
states remain reluctant to let go of their tax autonomy.2
Given the budgetary difficulties in many EU member
states, it stands to reason that European policymakers
will finally make a serious push towards more tax coor-
dination in the near future. Timid steps have already
* University of Goettingen, Germany. University of Goettingen, Germany.
1. See e.g. <http:// ec .europa .eu/ commission_ 2010 -2014/ semeta/
headlines/news/2011/01/201101192_en.htm> (last visited 4 Decem-
ber 2013).
2. G. Nicodeme, ‘Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in the
European Union: What Do We Do? Where Do We Stand?’, MPRA
Working Paper 2006:107.
been taken, such as the EU Commission’s proposal for a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB),
which is intended to facilitate the harmonisation of tax
bases.3 One of the rationales cited by the proponents of
increased coordination is that national tax autonomy
causes harmful tax competition and a race to the bot-
tom. Indeed, if tax competition constrains the ability of
governments to raise revenues, part of the solution to
the recent budgetary problems may appear to lie in
more coordinated tax policies.
The question is whether tax competition really repre-
sents such a severe constraint as to necessitate suprana-
tional intervention. Are European governments unable
to raise sufficient revenues because they have to fear
crumbling tax bases? Is tax competition constraining all
countries equally or only countries that share certain
characteristics? Are there no policies other than outright
coordination that could limit incentives to engage in tax
competition while allowing national governments to
retain a significant portion of their tax autonomy?
Answering such questions based on descriptive evidence
alone is difficult. Figure 1 presents the evolution of top
marginal personal income tax rates in 23 high-income
OECD countries from 2000 until 2013.4 Experiences
vary both between countries and over time. Until the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, top marginal tax
rates appear to have, on average, declined. However,
there is a considerable heterogeneity. While the decline
was pronounced in, for example, Norway and Germany,
top marginal tax rates remained stable or even increased
slightly in countries such as Japan and Sweden. After
the outbreak of the financial crisis, top marginal tax
rates appear to have increased in general. However,
developments again varied between countries: in New
Zealand, for example, top marginal tax rates decreased.
The development of corporate tax rates in OECD coun-
tries is similarly ambiguous. Figure 2 presents the
development of the combined (subnational and central)
statutory corporate tax rates. While there is in general a
declining trend, corporate tax rates have basically
3. See e.g. <http:// ec .europa .eu/ taxation_ customs/ taxation/ company_
tax/common_tax_base/\#ccctb> (last visited 4 December 2013).
4. The data on tax rates was obtained from the OECD’s Tax Database at
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm> (last visited
4 December 2013).
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remained stable in countries such as the United States
or Japan or, after the financial crisis, even slightly
increased in countries such as Iceland or Portugal.
Without a theoretical framework and appropriate
empirical methodologies, it is difficult to interpret the
descriptive evidence with respect to whether tax compe-
tition leads to a race to the bottom in tax rates.5 There-
fore, this article surveys the theoretical and empirical
literature on tax competition in the field of Economics.
The theoretical literature was initially confined to local
taxation, presumably because international tax competi-
tion was not an urgent issue before the acceleration of
globalisation during the 80s and 90s of the last century.
But recently, a sizeable literature specifically concerned
with cross-country tax competition has evolved. Mirror-
ing theoretical developments, the empirical literature
too was initially focused on local taxation, but has
expanded to the international domain with the availabil-
ity of appropriate data sets.
While the literature on tax competition has come a long
way, there still remain unfortunate trade-offs. Tax com-
petition can take place along many dimensions, but the
requirements of formal modelling and issues of data
availability force researchers to limit themselves to only
5. Another issue that has been discussed in the tax competition literature is
whether globalisation causes a convergence of tax rates, but not neces-
sarily to an inefficiently low level. See e.g. J. Slemrod, ‘Are Corporate
Tax Rates, or Countries, Converging?’, 88 Journal of Public Economics
1169 (2004); U. Wagschal, ‘Laender unter Anpassungsdruck? Der
Internationale Steuerwettbewerb: Ursachen, Wirkungen und Reaktio-
nen Gesellschaft’, 55 Wirtschaft und Politik 499 (2006); and W.N.
Brooks and T. Hwong, ‘Tax Levels, Structures, and Reforms: Conver-
gence or Persistence’, 11 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Comparative Tax
Law and Culture 791 (2010). We largely neglect this particular issue in
this survey.
a few decisive features of a country’s tax system. We
discuss in this article the advantages of the methodologi-
cal choices usually made in Economics and the disad-
vantages that the associated simplifications and generali-
sations entail. We then proceed to a discussion of the
conclusions advanced by the theoretical and the empiri-
cal literature and a description of the current consensus.
Finally, we discuss whether the results in the literature
imply that there is a need for further tax coordination in
the EU.
This article adds to a large array of existing surveys on
tax competition.6 The distinguishing features of our
survey are (i) an informal and intuitive summary of the
theoretical and empirical literature, (ii) a description of
the evidence both at the local and international levels
and (iii) a discussion of the implications of the existing
literature for tax harmonisation in the EU. While many
surveys have dealt with each of these issues separately,
one of our main contributions is to discuss them in a
unified framework and with a unique focus. For exam-
ple, Keen and Konrad (2012) emphasise theoretical
6. See e.g. J.D. Wilson, ‘Theories of Tax Competition’, 52 National Tax
Journal 269 (1999); T.A. Gresik, ‘The Taxing Task of Taxing Transna-
tionals’ 39 Journal of Economic Literature 800 (2001); G.R. Zodrow,
‘Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the EU’, 10 International Tax
and Public Finance 651 (2003); J.D. Wilson and D. Wildasin, ‘Capital
Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?’, 88 Journal of Public Economics 1065
(2004); G.R. Zodrow, ‘Capital Mobility and Tax Competition’, 63
National Tax Journal 865 (2010); H. Bloechliger and J. Pinero-Campos,
‘Tax Competition between Sub-Central Governments’, OECD Econom-
ics Department Working Paper 2011:872; P. Genschel and P. Schwarz,
‘Tax Competition: A Literature Review’, 9 Socio-Economic Review 339
(2011); M. Leibrecht and C. Hochgatterer, ‘Tax Competition as a Cause
of Falling Corporate Income Tax Rates: A Survey of Empirical Litera-
ture’, 26 Journal of Economic Surveys 616 (2012); and M. Keen and K.
Konrad, ‘The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordina-
tion’, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working
Paper 2012:6.
Figure 1 Marginal personal income tax rates in OECD countries
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results but are less detailed with respect to the empirical
evidence.7 Similarly, Genschel and Schwarz (2011) dis-
cuss international competition in different types of tax-
es, but neglect issues related to local taxation.8 A unified
discussion and a unique focus, however, are not the only
contributions of our survey. We also cover several
recent studies on tax competition that have not yet been
considered in previous surveys and that, as we will see,
lead to a re-evaluation of the need for tax harmonisation
in the EU.
2 The Theory of Tax
Competition
The first articles dealing with the consequences of unco-
ordinated tax policies by different political jurisdictions
emerged in the context of the economic analysis of local
fiscal policy. Tiebout (1956) argues that tax autonomy
allows local governments to offer citizens different tax
and expenditure bundles.9 As citizens can sort them-
selves across jurisdictions, tax competition leads to an
efficient outcome where different preferences of citizens
regarding public expenditure are translated into distinct
tax rates. Tax competition in this framework has there-
fore a desirable normative connotation. Subsequent con-
tributions have adapted the Tiebout model, which was
originally conceived with respect to households, to
7. Keen and Konrad, above n. 6.
8. Genschel and Schwarz, above n. 6.
9. C. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, 64 Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 416 (1956).
mobile firms.10 The results in these papers mirror those
of the original Tiebout model.
The modern literature on tax competition, however,
puts relatively little emphasis on the voting with one’s feet
rationale that underlies Tiebout’s model. Recent contri-
butions instead advance the idea that political jurisdic-
tions try to poach tax bases away from one another by
offering a lighter tax burden. This idea was initially for-
mulated by Bradford and Oates (1971) and Oates (1972),
albeit in an informal manner.11 These authors argue that
jurisdictions engaging in tax competition end up provid-
ing too few public goods: to attract mobile production
factors, they set lower than optimal tax rates.
It is, however, unclear whether a reduction in the size of
the public sector due to tax competition is necessarily
bad. The conclusion that lower tax rates as a result of
tax competition are harmful relies on the assumption
that governments set their tax policy in order to maxi-
mise the welfare of their citizens. This assumption is
questioned by the Public Choice tradition. Brennan and
Buchanan (1980), in particular, argue that governments
are Leviathans whose primary interest is to maximise tax
revenues as such: governments do not tax to provide
essential public goods but because higher tax revenues
enhance, for example, the power and prestige of govern-
ment officials.12
10. See e.g. M.J. White, ‘Firm Location in a Zoned Metropolitan Area’, in
W. Oates and E. Mills (eds.), Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls
(1975).
11. D. Bradford and W. Oates, ‘The Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New
Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions’, 85 Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 416 (1971); and W. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (1972).
12. G. Brennan and J. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations
of a Fiscal Constitution (1980).
Figure 2 Combined statutory corporate tax rates in OECD countries
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Despite the long-standing debate around the two con-
flicting views on the normative implications of tax com-
petition, a formal treatment emerged only in the late
1980s. The seminal papers by Wilson (1986) and
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) (from now on referred
to as WZM model) adhere to the notion of benevolent
governments.13 Mirroring the informal literature, these
models predict a shift of taxes from mobile capital to
immobile factors of production and hence a race to the
bottom in the taxation of mobile factors.
The mechanism is as follows. The revenue loss of a tax
rate cut for an individual jurisdiction is smaller than the
revenue loss for the country as a whole because part of
the decline in revenues in the tax-cutting jurisdiction is
compensated by mobile factors migrating into it. This
inward migration increases the size of the base in the
tax-cutting jurisdiction, but this increase comes at the
expense of all other jurisdictions. The choice of tax rate
thus involves a fundamental trade-off. High tax rates on
mobile factors lead, on the one hand, to higher revenues
for a given tax base. On the other hand, high tax rates
drive away some of the tax base into other jurisdictions.
The net effect of an increase in the rate is thus ambigu-
ous: when contemplating tax cuts, local governments
have to weigh the rise in revenues because of a larger tax
base against a decline because of lower rates. This calcu-
lus implies that local governments neglect the externali-
ties of their tax policy: a larger tax base in their jurisdic-
tion implies a smaller one in all other jurisdictions.
Thus, the social costs (in terms of lower revenues) of a
reduction in tax rates are larger than the individual
costs, which leads to inefficiently low tax rates in equili-
brium.
Formal models that study the Leviathan hypothesis
have been developed by Edwards and Keen (1996) and
Rauscher (1996, 1998).14 In these frameworks, the aim
of every jurisdiction is to maximise its own tax revenues.
However, since citizens can emigrate from jurisdictions
where the tax burden is too high, tax competition
entails, in equilibrium, lower average tax rates through-
out the country. Even though these models predict a
reduction in the size of government, it is derived that
this reduction is – as in the informal literature – benefi-
cial.
Despite the disagreement, the prevailing view remains
that tax competition is harmful and leads to suboptimal-
ly low tax rates on the mobile production factors.15 Con-
sequently, the subsequent literature has extended the
WZM model along different lines. One of the exten-
sions was to focus on interregional commodity trade.
13. J.D. Wilson, ‘A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition’, 19 Journal of
Urban Economics 296 (1986); G.R. Zodrow and P. Mieszkowski, ‘Pigou,
Tiebout, Property Taxation and the Under-provision of Local Public
Goods’, 19 Journal of Urban Economics 356 (1986).
14. J. Edwards and M. Keen, ‘Tax Competition and Leviathan’, 40 European
Economic Review 113 (1996); M. Rauscher, ‘Interjurisdictional Compe-
tition and the Efficiency of the Public Sector: The Triumph of the Mar-
ket over the State?’, Kiel Working Paper 1996:732; and M. Rauscher,
‘Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit
Taxation’, 44 Journal of Urban Economics 59 (1998).
15. Wilson (1999), above n. 6.
Wilson (1987) shows that in such a framework, capital
taxation creates an inefficient distribution of public
goods and inefficient trade patterns.16 Nevertheless, he
derives that in contrast to the WZM model, overall pub-
lic spending must not necessarily be lower than the effi-
cient level.
Another natural extension of the WZM model was to
dispense with the assumption that all jurisdictions are
the same. By introducing asymmetry into the model,
Wilson (1991) and Bucovetsky (1991) study the conse-
quences of tax competition between large and small
jurisdictions and show that economic and sociodemo-
graphic variables determine whether a particular juris-
diction benefits from competition.17 Wilson (1991)
derives that small jurisdictions are better off under tax
competition than under tax coordination.18 Bucovetsky
(1991), while obtaining in general similar results, derives
in addition that equilibrium tax rates are higher in larger
jurisdictions.19
Wildasin (1998) changes the focus from the purely com-
petitive model with a large number of jurisdictions to an
analysis of only a few local governments.20 Consequent-
ly, strategic interactions are explicitly studied.21 He
shows that if governments use spending as the strategic
choice variable and therefore let tax rates adjust residu-
ally, then tax rates of different jurisdictions are strategic
substitutes.22 In this setting, a reduction in tax rates by
other jurisdictions causes a given jurisdiction to increase
its own tax rate. The rationale is that if a jurisdiction has
to maintain a given level of spending, then an outflow of
tax bases because of tax cuts in other jurisdictions neces-
sitates the increase of one’s own tax rate.
A further strand of the literature on tax competition
builds on the so-called New Economic Geography mod-
els.23 In this framework, certain jurisdictions have
agglomeration advantages. Owing to these advantages,
firms that settle in these jurisdictions can expect higher
profits. Therefore, jurisdictions that offer more agglom-
eration advantages can afford to levy higher tax rates.
16. J.D. Wilson, ‘Trade, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition’, 95 Journal
of Political Economy 835 (1987).
17. J.D. Wilson, ‘Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor
Endowments’, 21 Regional Science and Urban Economics 423 (1991);
and S. Bucovetsky, ‘Asymmetric Tax Competition’, 20 Journal of Urban
Economics 167 (1991).
18. Wilson (1991), above n. 17.
19. Bucovetsky, above n. 17.
20. D. Wildasin, ‘Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition’, 35 Jour-
nal of Public Economics 229 (1998).
21. For similar models see e.g. J. Mintz and H. Tulkens, ‘Commodity Tax
Competition between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and
Efficiency’, 29 Journal of Public Economics 133 (1986); and A. de Com-
brugghe and H. Tulkens, ‘On Pareto Improving Commodity Tax
Changes under Fiscal Competition’, 41 Journal of Public Economics 335
(1990).
22. In the tax competition context, the statement that tax rates are strategic
substitutes implies that if other jurisdictions increase their tax rate for
some exogenous reason, a given jurisdiction decreases its tax rate.
23. See e.g. R. Ludema and I. Wooton, ‘Economic Geography and the Fiscal
Effects of Regional Integration’, 52 Journal of International Economics
331 (2000); and R.E. Baldwin and P. Krugman, ‘Agglomeration, Inte-
gration and Tax Harmonization’, 48 European Economic Review 1
(2004).
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Indeed, it can be derived in these models that economic
integration may under certain circumstances lead to a
race to the top rather than a race to the bottom.24
A relatively novel literature analyses how features of the
public sector distinct from, yet related to, issues of taxa-
tion affect tax competition. An institution that exists in
most countries at the local level is a fiscal equalisation
scheme. Such a scheme can be structured either verti-
cally or horizontally: either the central government or
the other jurisdictions in the same tier of government
provide transfers to appropriately defined fiscally weak
jurisdictions. The transfers are typically a function of
the tax-raising capacity of a given jurisdiction, that is,
the value of the tax base. Theoretical contributions such
as Fenge and Wrede (2007),25 Kelders and Koethen-
buerger (2010) and Kotsogiannis (2010) show that
incentives to engage in tax competition are lower in the
presence of such equalisation schemes.26
Although the models reviewed above offer abstract anal-
yses of tax competition that can be applied either to sub-
national jurisdictions or to sovereign countries, they
were originally developed to study local rather than
international settings. However, a large theoretical liter-
ature has recently developed that specifically models
international tax competition.27
First, a set of models in this literature integrates both
local and international tax competition within a unified
framework. For example, Wilson and Janeba (2005)
show that decentralisation of tax policy and thus tax
competition between subnational governments can serve
as a commitment device for the central government in
international tax competition and thus improve the wel-
fare of a country as a whole.28 Similar contributions are
provided by Grazzini and Petretto (2007) and Kessing,
Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2009).29
Yet many papers that explicitly focus on international
tax competition are concerned with how national tax
policy as such affects mobile factors. Bjorvatn and
Schjelderup (2002) study how tax competition between
countries plays out when they provide international
24. For a review of the New Economic Geography literature with a specific
focus on tax competition see R. Forslid, ‘Tax Competition and Agglom-
eration: Main Effects and Empirical Implications’, 12 Swedish Economic
Policy Review 113 (2005).
25. R. Fenge and M. Wrede, ‘EU Financing and Regional Policy: Vertical
Fiscal Externalities When Capital Is Mobile’, 63 FinanzArchiv 457
(2007).
26. C. Kelders and M. Koethenbuerger, ‘Tax Incentives in Fiscal Federalism:
An Integrated Perspective’, 43 Canadian Journal of Economics 683
(2010); and C. Kotsogiannis, ‘Federal Tax Competition and the Efficien-
cy Consequences for Local Taxation of Revenue Equalization’, 17 Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 1 (2010).
27. For a more technical survey than ours, see Keen and Konrad, above
n. 6.
28. J.D. Wilson and E. Janeba, ‘Decentralization and International Tax Com-
petition’, 89 Journal of Public Economics 1211 (2005).
29. L. Grazzini and A. Petretto, ‘Tax Competition between Unitary and Fed-
eral Countries’, 8 Economics of Governance 17 (2007); and S. Kessing,
K. Konrad and C. Kotsogiannis, ‘Federalism, Weak Institutions and the
Competition for Foreign Direct Investments’, 16 International Tax and
Public Finance 105 (2009).
public goods.30 Razin and Sadka (1991) study how trade
harmonisation is related to international tax competi-
tion.31 Haufler and Wooton (1999) explore how country
size interacts with tax competition.32 In the relevant
models, the mobile factor is typically interpreted as cap-
ital or foreign direct investment (FDI).
A notable aspect of international tax competition is that
it can take place over more bases than at the local level.
For example, Becker and Fuest (2010) analyse the taxa-
tion of profits from international mergers and acquisi-
tions and derive conditions for an optimal tax treatment
of such profits.33 Fuest (2005) analyses the role of for-
eign firm ownership for tax competition.34 He derives
that taxes may fall with economic integration even if for-
eign ownership of firms is possible. Fuest, Hunter and
Mintz (2005) offer a survey35 that discusses various oth-
er features and peculiarities of international taxation.36
Finally, another strand of the literature on international
tax competition is concerned with the consequences of
tax coordination. Coordination, if it were possible and
costless, would result in the optimal outcome. However,
there are various limits to coordination. Peralta and
Ypersele (2006) develop a model with asymmetric coun-
tries where they derive that in the presence of a com-
mon lower bound for tax rates, some countries are better
off while others are worse off.37 Konrad (2009) shows in
a similar framework that minimum taxes might reduce
rather than increase equilibrium taxes.38 Wang (1999)
studies tax coordination in a sequential framework.39 He
derives that if tax policy decisions are taken sequential-
ly, then the Stackelberg Leader wins and the Follower
loses from tax coordination. Consequently, it is not clear
whether tax coordination improves welfare on average.
3 The Empirical Evidence
The literature on tax competition at the local level anal-
yses whether there are strategic interactions in tax set-
30. K. Bjorvatn and G. Schjelderup, ‘Tax Competition with International
Public Goods’, 9 International Tax and Public Finance 111 (2002).
31. A. Razin and E. Sadka, ‘International Tax Competition and Gains from
Tax Harmonization’, 37 Economic Letters 69 (1991).
32. A. Haufler and I. Wooton, ‘Country Size and Tax Competition for For-
eign Direct Investment’, 71 Journal of Public Economics 121 (1999).
33. J. Becker and C. Fuest, ‘Taxing Foreign Profits with International Merg-
ers and Acquisitions’, 51 International Economic Review 171 (2010).
34. C. Fuest, ‘Economic Integration and Tax Policy with Endogenous For-
eign Firm Ownership’, 89 Journal of Public Economics 1823 (2005).
35. C. Fuest, B. Huber and J. Mintz, ‘Capital Mobility and Tax Competition’,
1 Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 1 (2005).
36. For example, the implications of residence vs. source based taxation or
the role of formula apportionment for transfer pricing have been dis-
cussed in the literature. See also Keen and Konrad, above n. 6, and the
references therein.
37. S. Peralta and T. Ypersele, ‘Coordination of Capital Taxation among
Asymmetric Countries’, 36 Regional Science and Urban Economics 708
(2006).
38. K. Konrad, ‘Non-Binding Minimum Taxes May Foster Tax Competition’,
102 Economics Letters 109 (2009).
39. Y.Q. Wang, ‘Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg
Equilibrium and Optimality’, 89 American Economic Review 974
(1999).
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ting behaviour by subnational governments. The idea is
that if tax competition exists, then there should be a sys-
tematic relationship between the tax choices of a given
jurisdiction and those of its neighbours. As the theoreti-
cal literature shows, tax rates could be either strategic
complements or strategic substitutes.40 Similarly, tax
competition could lead to either a race to the bottom or
to the top. At the outset, therefore, it is not only unclear
whether local tax autonomy really entails tax competi-
tion, but it is equally uncertain whether tax competition,
assuming it exists, will lead to higher or lower equilibri-
um tax rates.
Yet until recently, the empirical results from the local
level were fairly conclusive. The majority of the relevant
studies find that tax rates are strategic complements: a
decrease in the tax rate by other jurisdictions leads to a
decrease in one’s own. This, in turn, suggests that tax
competition leads to a race to the bottom, at least at the
local level. Evidence to this effect has been provided in
various settings. Typically, business and property taxes
are analysed. An overview of the early empirical litera-
ture on local tax competition is offered by Brueckner
(2003).41
More recent contributions are Buettner (2001),42 who
explores German municipalities; Brueckner and Saave-
dra (2001),43 who study the Boston metropolitan area;
Leprince, Madies and Paty (2007) and Charlot and Paty
(2007), who explore French municipalities;44 and Feld
and Reulier (2009), who study Swiss cantons.45 These
studies find, in general, evidence for tax competition,
and more specifically evidence indicating that tax rates
are strategic complements. However, there are results in
the literature indicating that tax rates are strategic sub-
stitutes: Rork (2003) and Chirinko and Wilson (2011),46
for example, find that US states decrease (some) tax
rates in response to an increase in rates in other states.
One criticism that has been voiced recently against
much of the empirical literature on local tax competition
is that the estimates rely on unreasonable identifying
40. Strategic complements are the opposite of strategic substitutes (above
n. 22) and imply that if other jurisdictions increase their tax rate for
some exogenous reason, a given jurisdiction increases its tax rate too.
41. J. Brueckner, ‘Strategic Interaction among Governments: An Overview
of Empirical Studies’, 26 International Regional Science Review 175
(2003).
42. T. Buettner, ‘Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The
Choice of the Tax Rate’, 31 Regional Science and Urban Economics 215
(2001).
43. J. Brueckner and L. Saavedra, ‘Do Local Governments Engage in Strate-
gic Property Tax Competition?’, 54 National Tax Journal 231 (2001).
44. M. Leprince, T. Madies and S. Paty, ‘Business Tax Interactions among
Local Governments: An Empirical Analysis of the French Case’, 47 Jour-
nal of Regional Science 603 (2007); S. Charlot and S. Paty, ‘Market
Access Effect and Local Tax Setting: Evidence from French Panel Data’,
7 Journal of Economic Geography 1 (2007).
45. L.P. Feld and E. Reulier, ‘Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evi-
dence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons’, 10 German Economic
Review 91 (2009).
46. J. Rork, ‘Coveting Thy Neighbor’s Taxation’, 56 National Tax Journal
775 (2003); and R.S. Chirinko and J.D. Wilson, ‘Tax Competition
among U.S. States: Racing to the Bottom or Riding a Seesaw’, CESifo
Working Paper 2011:3535.
assumptions.47 More specifically, the effect of the
neighbours’ tax policy is typically identified either
through functional form assumptions or by using neigh-
bours’ characteristics as instruments to induce quasi-
exogenous variation in neighbouring tax rates. It is
unlikely that the functional form assumptions are valid
or that neighbours’ characteristics are truly exogenous.
A small number of papers use more elaborate identifica-
tion strategies. Lyytikainen (2012) exploits a reform that
increased statutory lower limits in Finland to induce
quasi-exogenous variation in local tax rates.48 He finds
no evidence for tax competition (and more generally for
tax mimicking) in property tax rates. Baskaran (2013)
uses a reform to the local fiscal equalisation scheme in a
German subfederal state to identify tax competition by
municipalities in a neighbouring state.49 Again no evi-
dence in favour of tax competition is found. These
results contrast the findings based on the standard
approach described above, suggesting that the evidence
for tax competition in much of the earlier literature
might indeed be suspect.
Similarly, Parchet (2012) focuses on Swiss municipali-
ties located close to cantonal borders.50 He uses varia-
tion in cantonal-level tax rates in neighbouring cantons
to induce quasi-exogenous variation in tax rates in a giv-
en municipality. His results suggest once more that
standard approaches lead to wrong conclusions. While
he finds evidence for tax competition when using the
standard methodology with the sign of the estimates
indicating that tax rates are strategic complements, once
he uses his new methodology, he finds that tax rates are
actually strategic substitutes.
The empirical literature on international tax competi-
tion is in many ways more complex than the one on local
tax competition. One reason for this complexity is that it
is difficult to identify an appropriate measure for the tax
burden on mobile factors. At the local level, it is rela-
tively easy to measure the tax burden on a specific
mobile factor because bases tend to be the same. Sec-
ond, any further taxes that could affect the decisions of
this mobile factor are typically set by higher tiers of gov-
ernment and are therefore the same for all local govern-
ments. But at the national level, citizens’ and firms’
decisions are dependent on various taxes, which vary
between countries not only in rates but also with respect
to bases.
A second complication is that countries can compete
over various mobile tax bases. Theoretical models typi-
cally model some abstract mobile production factor that
they refer to as capital. But as indicated previously, the
mobile factor can assume many forms. It can be under-
47. S. Gibbons and H.G. Overman, ‘Mostly Pointless Spatial Econometrics’,
52 Journal of Regional Science 172 (2012).
48. T. Lyytikainen, ‘Tax Competition among Local Governments: Evidence
from a Property Tax Reform in Finland’, 96 Journal of Public Economics
584 (2012).
49. T. Baskaran, ‘Identifying Local Tax Mimicking: Administrative Borders
and a Policy Reform’, Center for European Governance and Economic
Development Research Discussion Paper 2013:157.
50. B. Parchet, ‘Are Local Tax Rates Strategic Complements or Strategic
Substitutes?’ (Mimeo Universities of Lausanne and Basel 2012).
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stood as financial capital, paper profits, FDI or firms
and high-skilled individuals. Each of these factors is
subject to different taxes. Identifying a single measure
that reflects for each country the tax burden on mobile
factors is therefore challenging.
One strand of the literature uses total tax revenues or
tax revenues from the corporate and related taxes (e.g.
profit taxes) as share of GDP to proxy levels of
taxation,51 albeit sometimes with sophisticated modifi-
cations.52 The idea is that tax competition should
increase with economic integration. Hence, there should
be a negative relationship between economic integration
and tax revenues. In general, studies following this
approach find no evidence for a decline in tax revenues
due to economic integration, and therefore no evidence
for harmful tax competition.53 Similarly, using a novel
method to calculate tax rates on factor incomes, Mendo-
za and Tezar (2005)54 find that tax competition has not
triggered a race to the bottom in the EU with respect to
capital taxation.55
However, revenue-based measures for tax competition
have a number of shortcomings.56 First, total tax reve-
nues are endogenous to the tax burden on mobile fac-
tors, which can obviously migrate to countries with low-
er tax rates. Consequently, this measure will tend to
underestimate the true tax burden. Second, total tax
revenues reflect the burden not only on mobile factors
but also on immobile factors. Consequently, tax reve-
nues as share of GDP or similar measures will proxy the
true tax burden on mobile factors such as corporations
with error. Third, this ratio is a backward-looking meas-
ure: it is affected by past tax policies, but does not accu-
rately indicate how future policies will evolve. Mobile
factors, however, will be primarily concerned with
future developments.
Another strand of the literature, therefore, makes a dif-
ferent compromise. Rather than analysing the full tax
burden, these studies focus on a specific mobile factor.
The taxation of corporations has received primary atten-
51. D. Swank and S. Steinmo, ‘The New Political Economy of Taxation in
Advanced Capitalist Democracies’, 46 American Journal of Political Sci-
ence 671 (2002); and G. Garrett and D. Mitchell, ‘Globalisation, Gov-
ernment Spending, and Taxation in the OECD’, 39 European Journal of
Political Research 145 (2001).
52. E.G. Mendoza, A. Razin, and L. Tesar, ‘Effective Tax Rates in Macroeco-
nomics: Cross-Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and
Consumption’, 34 Journal of Monetary Economics 297 (1994).
53. M.P. Devereux and S. Loretz, ‘What Do We Know about Corporate Tax
Competition’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working
Paper 2012:29.
54. E.G. Mendoza and L. Tezar, ‘Why Hasn’t Tax Competition Triggered a
Race to the Bottom? Some Quantitative Lessons from the EU’, 52 Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 163 (2005).
55. A related literature studies the effect of globalisation on the welfare
state. According to Garrett and Mitchell, above n. 51, the effect of
globalisation on the welfare state can either reduce government spend-
ing (the efficiency hypothesis) or expand it (compensation hypothesis).
For further evidence in support of the compensation hypothesis, which
indicates that globalisation leads to higher rather than lower taxation,
see also D. Rodrik, ‘Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Gov-
ernments?’, 106 Journal of Political Economy 997 (1998).
56. M.P. Devereux, R. Griffith and A. Klemm, ‘Corporate Income Tax
Reforms and International Tax Competition’, 17 Economic Policy 449
(2002).
tion. Countries have strong incentives to attract corpo-
rations by offering lower tax burdens. Corporations not
only represent a valuable tax base, they also offer
employment to voters. The main aim of this literature is
to uncover trends and co-movements in tax rates
between different countries and to interpret these trends
with respect to international tax competition. Yet while
it is possible that corporations are affected by the statu-
tory tax rate, it is problematic that it might not reflect
the true tax burden at the national level as definitions of
the bases vary between countries. To address this prob-
lem, researchers calculate effective tax rates that are dis-
tinct from the statutory ones and reflect both bases and
rates.
Two types of effective tax rates have been used in the
literature.57 First, the effective marginal tax rate
(EMTR). This measure reflects the increase in the pre-
tax cost of capital of an investment whose post-tax
returns just cover the interest rate, that is a marginal
investment. More specifically, the difference between
pre-tax and post-tax returns divided by pre-tax returns
of the marginal investment is defined as the EMTR.
Incentives to invest decline with increasing EMTR.
One feature of the EMTR is that only continuous
investment decisions – how much to invest – are affec-
ted by this tax measure. Discrete choices – whether or
not to invest at all – are not accurately captured by the
EMTR. When deciding whether to invest at all, mobile
factors will not be particularly concerned with the tax
burden on a marginal investment but with the average
tax burden on the investment as a whole. In order to
model such discrete decisions, researchers calculate an
alternative measure: the effective average tax rate
(EATR). This measure is typically defined as the net
present value of all future tax payments divided by the
net present value of all future pre-tax returns.
There are several studies that explore trends in statutory
or effective tax rates and tax revenues. An early example
is the report by the Ruding Committee that investigated
capital taxation in the 1980s.58 This report finds that
statutory tax rates have declined in Europe, while bases
have become broader. The committee concludes from
this pattern that tax competition leads to lower tax rates.
Genschel, Kemmerling and Seils (2011) show that stat-
utory corporate tax rates in Europe have declined faster
than in the rest of the world since 1990, from which
they conclude that corporate tax competition in the EU
is stronger than elsewhere.59 Similarly, Devereux, Grif-
fith and Klemm (2002) establish for the EU and the G7
countries that effective average corporate tax rates have
declined, while marginal tax rates have not changed
57. Devereux, Griffith & Klemm, above n. 56.
58. O. Ruding, ‘Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Com-
pany Taxation’ [commonly called the Ruding Report], Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities (1992).
59. P. Genschel, A. Kemmerling and E. Seils, ‘Accelerating Downhill: How
the EU Shapes Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market’, 49
Journal of Common Market Studies 585 (2011).
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much in the 1990s.60 These results, too, provide some
evidence for tax competition causing lower tax rates.
While continuing to emphasise forward-looking statuto-
ry and effective tax rates, another strand of the literature
uses formal econometric techniques to study tax compe-
tition instead of looking only at trends and patterns.
Benassy-Quere, Fontagne and Lahreche-Revil (2005)
analyse the effect of the statutory corporate tax rate on
FDI and find evidence for (imperfect) competition in a
panel of 11 OECD countries.61 Bellack and Leibrecht
(2009) provide similar evidence for a panel of Central-
and Eastern-European countries.62 Wolff (2007) too63
finds evidence for a significant effect of taxes on FDI.
However, the effect varies for different FDI subcompo-
nents.64 Rademacher (2013) compares EMU with non-
EMU countries with difference-in-difference regres-
sions.65 The results indicate that especially small EMU
countries engage in tax competition. More specifically,
the author shows that through the course of European
integration, effective average tax rates have decreased in
small and increased in large EMU countries.
A further strand of the literature attempts to apply the
spatial models through which local tax competition is
analysed to the international level. The idea is to explore
whether tax rates in neighbouring countries affect the
rates in a given country. Devereux, Lockwood and
Redoano (2008) find in a sample of 21 OECD countries
that they compete over corporate tax rates only if their
economies are open.66 This finding indicates that tax
competition does not, in general, diminish revenues at
the national level. Using a data set on corporate tax
reforms within Europe, Heinemann, Overesch and
Rincke (2010) show that countries react to the tax rates
of their neighbours.67 Egger, Pfaffermayr and Winner
(2007), on the other hand, find evidence for strategic
interactions in corporate and personal income tax rates
60. Devereux, Griffith & Klemm, above n. 56.
61. A. Benassy-Quere, L. Fontagne and A. Lahreche-Revil, ‘How Does FDI
React to Corporate Taxation’, 12 International Tax and Public Finance
583 (2005).
62. C. Bellak and M. Leibrecht, ‘Do Low Corporate Income Tax Rates
Attract FDI? Evidence from Central- and East European Countries’, 41
Applied Economics 2691 (2009).
63. G.B. Wolff, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in the Enlarged EU’, 18 Open
Economics Review 327 (2007).
64. In addition, see J. Hines, ‘Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational
Corporations’, in A.J. Auerbach (ed.), Fiscal Policy: Lessons from Eco-
nomic Research (1997) 401; and J. Hines, ‘Tax Sparing and Direct
Investment in Developing Countries’, NBER Working Paper 1998:6728,
for claims that international tax rules have a decisive influence on
behaviour of multinational firms, in particular on the location and scope
of international business activity.
65. I. Rademacher, ‘Tax Competition in the Eurozone: Capital Mobility,
Agglomeration, and the Small Country Disadvantage’, MPlfG Discus-
sion Paper 2013:13
66. M.P. Devereux, B. Lockwood and M. Redoano, ‘Do Countries Compete
over Corporate Tax Rates?’, 92 Journal of Public Economics 1210
(2008).
67. F. Heinemann, M. Overesch and J. Rincke, ‘Rate-Cutting Tax Reforms
and Corporate Tax Competition in Europe’, 22 Economics & Politics
498 (2010).
in OECD countries.68 In a related contribution, Altshu-
ler and Goodspeed (2002) study interactions between
European countries and the United States during the
period 1968 to 1996.69 Their results suggest that compe-
tition among European countries in corporate tax rates
has decreased over the sample period.
While corporate tax rates are a prominent indicator to
measure tax competition, there are a number of alterna-
tive instruments that countries employ. Except for offi-
cial and effective rates, countries can offer corporations
and other mobile factors favourable tax treatments and
facilitate tax evasion.70 Examples include tax holidays,
favourable transfer pricing schemes, preferential
regimes or opportunities for profit shifting. In the
extreme, countries can become tax havens. The incen-
tives and actions along these dimensions are different
from those in the standard tax competition framework,
but the results are often similar. In equilibrium, coun-
tries tend to overprovide favourable tax treatments.
There are, however, some notable idiosyncrasies. Johan-
nesen and Zucman (2013), for example, study the effect
of G20 countries’ compelling tax havens to share bank
information during the financial crisis.71 They find that
this intervention did not lead to a repatriation of funds
but rather to a shifting of money to havens that did not
comply with the demands of the G20.72
Finally, following the theoretical contributions, a rela-
tively recent strand of the empirical literature explores
how fiscal equalisation is related to tax policy. Theory
and evidence from the local level suggest that certain
intergovernmental transfer schemes can be an effective
means to limit tax competition. These so-called capacity
equalisation schemes typically work as follows. For each
jurisdiction, a measure of fiscal need is calculated. Typi-
cally, this measure is roughly equal to average local tax
revenues per capita. The fiscal need measure is then
compared with a measure of fiscal capacity. This second
measure is roughly equal to local tax revenues per capi-
ta. A share of the difference between fiscal need and fis-
cal capacity is then compensated by central transfers.
Smart (1998) and Koethenbuerger (2002) show theoreti-
cally that equilibrium tax rates are higher if such a sys-
tem of fiscal equalisation is in place.73 Empirical evi-
dence from the German state of Lower-Saxony to this
effect is offered by Egger, Koethenbuerger and Smart
68. P. Egger, M. Pfaffermayr and H. Winner, ‘Competition in Corporate
and Personal Income Taxation’ (Mimeo Oxford Centre for Business
Taxation 2007).
69. R. Altshuler and T.J. Goodspeed, ‘Follow the Leader? Evidence on Euro-
pean and U.S. Tax Competition’, Rutgers University Department of
Economics Departmental Working Paper 2002:26.
70. OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998).
71. N. Johannesen and G. Zucman, ‘The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evalua-
tion of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown’ (Mimeo University of Copenha-
gen and Paris School of Economics 2013).
72. For a review of the literature on tax havens see D. Dharmapala, ‘What
Problems and Opportunities Are Created by Tax Havens?’, 24 Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 661 (2009).
73. M. Smart, ‘Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovern-
mental Transfers’, 31 Canadian Journal of Economics 189 (1998); and
M. Koethenbuerger, ‘Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization’, 70 Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 391 (2002).
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(2010).74 Similar evidence for the state of Baden-Würt-
temberg is offered by Buettner (2006).75
No corresponding evidence is available at the interna-
tional level as there are no formal international fiscal
equalisation schemes yet. However, such an equalisation
scheme might become a reality in the EU in the foresee-
able future.
4 Lessons for the European
Union
What do the theoretical and empirical results imply for
the future of tax coordination in the EU? The subsidiar-
ity principle, which is enshrined in Article 5 of the EU,
states that ‘decisions are to be taken as closely as possi-
ble to the citizen and that constant checks are made to
verify that action at Union level is justified’.76 Conse-
quently, tax coordination at the EU level should be pur-
sued only if tax competition is truly a problem for pub-
lic budgets and national-level measures are unable to
resolve this problem adequately.
Is tax competition really a problem? Answering this
question involves addressing first the positive question
of whether tax revenues really suffer because of tax
competition. As shown, theoretical predictions are
ambiguous and depend on the assumptions that underlie
each specific model.
Still, the general consensus is that tax competition con-
stitutes a binding constraint for political jurisdictions
and thus causes a race to the bottom. Much of this con-
sensus can be explained by the early empirical papers on
tax competition at the local level, which typically found
that local tax rates are strategic complements. However,
recent papers that employ a credible identification strat-
egy come to different conclusions. In short, there is little
evidence for a race to the bottom at the local level.
Empirical studies that explore tax competition at the
international level do not indicate that tax competition
leads to large revenue losses either. Even if (effective)
tax rates seem to have declined in the last few years in
European countries, revenues have remained largely sta-
ble.77
From a positive perspective, therefore, tax competition
does not seem to be an urgent problem for European
74. P. Egger, M. Koethenbuerger and M. Smart, ‘Do Fiscal Transfers Allevi-
ate Business Tax Competition? Evidence from Germany’, 94 Journal of
Public Economics 235 (2010).
75. T. Buettner, ‘The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax
Policy’, 90 Journal of Public Economics 477 (2006). Further related
empirical evidence is available. For evidence with regard to Canada see
M. Hayashi and R. Boadway, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Intergovernmen-
tal Tax Interaction: The Case of Business Income Taxes in Canada’, 34
Canadian Journal of Economics, 481 (2001); and M. Smart, ‘Raising
Taxes through Equalization’, 40 Canadian Journal of Economics, 1188
(2007). For evidence with regard to Australia see B. Dahlby and N.A.
Warren, ‘The Fiscal Incentive Effects of the Australian Equalization Sys-
tem’, 79 Economic Record 434 (2003).
76. Art. 5 Treaty on European Union.
77. Devereux and Loretz, above n. 53.
countries. But even if tax competition were to lead to
revenue losses, it is not obvious how such consequences
can be evaluated normatively. Much depends on wheth-
er governments are perceived as benevolent or as Levia-
thans. If governments are reasonably benevolent, the
negative features of tax competition will dominate the
positive ones. But if they are not, then it is not clear that
a race to the bottom is necessarily undesirable. In reali-
ty, some governments will conform more to the ideal of
benevolence than others. Whether the EU as a whole
will benefit from tax coordination is thus unclear for this
reason alone.
But even if governments are benevolent and tax compe-
tition is truly a threat to public budgets, it can be ques-
tioned whether tax coordination is the appropriate
answer. First, not all countries will benefit equally from
coordination. Theoretical models that allow for asym-
metry between political jurisdictions derive – depending
on the specific model – that either larger or smaller
jurisdictions benefit more from tax coordination. Thus
the gains of coordination will be spread unevenly; some
jurisdictions might even be worse off. It is not clear why
those that will be hurt by tax coordination should sup-
port it.78 Indeed, that there are losers to tax coordination
might be the reason why the EU has hitherto found it
difficult to make much progress in this area. Heinemann
and Osterloh (2013), for example, show, on the basis of,
a survey that several variables determine whether mem-
bers of the European Parliament support a minimum
corporate tax.79 While ideology as well as individual
characteristics are important, national interests play a
role too. In particular, parliamentarians from countries
with high corporate taxes support minimum tax rates in
the EU.
Second, it can also be questioned whether tax coordina-
tion within the EU is the best way forward if there
remains the possibility of tax competition with other
regions of the world. Sorensen (2004) attempts to quan-
tify the welfare gains from tax coordination within a
group of countries and finds that such gains are modest
relative to those that could be obtained if taxes were
harmonised worldwide.80
Third, some authors argue that European influence over
national tax policies is already fairly large. On the basis
of a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and
ECJ tax jurisprudence, for example, Genschel and Jach-
tenfuchs (2011) claim that the EU, despite lacking tax-
ing power in the conventional sense, exerts ample regu-
latory power over national taxation.81 In particular, both
the VAT and excise taxes are extensively regulated. A
further and notably explicit coordination of tax rates
78. V. Dehejia and P. Genschel, ‘Tax Competition in the European Union’,
27 Politics and Society 403 (1999).
79. F. Heinemann and S. Osterloh, ‘The Political Economy of Corporate Tax
Harmonisation – Why Do European Politicians (Dis)Like Minimum Tax
Rates?’, 29 European Journal of Political Economy 18 (2013).
80. P.B. Sorensen, ‘International Tax Coordination: Regionalism versus
Globalism’, 88 Journal of Public Economics 1187 (2004).
81. P. Genschel and M. Jachtenfuchs, ‘How the European Union Constrains
the State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation’, 50 European Journal of
Political Research 293 (2011).
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would therefore imply that national autonomy over an
important policy area will be effectively abolished. This
is a strong intervention. In view of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, we should ask whether there are weaker instru-
ments to address any adverse effects of tax competition.
Efforts are underway to reshape the EU into a full-
fledged fiscal federation. In particular, the introduction
of explicit intergovernmental transfers between coun-
tries is being discussed. This discussion is being held in
view of the current budgetary difficulties in some of the
Southern member states. However, intergovernmental
transfer schemes can also be a means to address the neg-
ative aspects of tax competition in a less invasive way
than outright tax harmonisation. As argued above,
capacity equalisation schemes provide incentives for
jurisdictions to choose higher tax rates voluntarily and
thus counteract any race to the bottom.
A reasonable compromise between excessive tax compe-
tition and outright harmonisation might hence be the
introduction of an intergovernmental transfer scheme. If
structured appropriately, a transfer scheme is a milder
and more efficient alternative to a centrally coordinated
tax policy with no or only little room for national flexi-
bility. As an added advantage, such a transfer scheme
would offer the possibility for explicit side-payments
between countries and thereby to achieve a mutually
beneficial equilibrium. For example, countries that are
particularly sceptical of tax coordination could be given
either unconditional transfers or they could be offered a
higher compensation rate in the equalisation formula.
5 Conclusion
In this survey, we summarise the state of the theoretical
and empirical literature on tax competition in the field
of Economics. We argue that the theoretical predictions
are ambiguous. Empirical results are inconclusive as
well: early contributions point towards a race to the bot-
tom, while more recent ones reach more differentiated
conclusions. On the basis of this evidence, we discuss
whether increased tax coordination is a suitable way for-
ward for the EU. Our assessment is that the case for
substantial tax coordination in the EU is rather weak.
This assessment, however, does not imply that there is
no room at all for tax coordination in the EU. While tax
coordination may not be necessary to combat a race to
the bottom, some degree of harmonisation in national
tax laws will certainly be beneficial. Harmonised tax
bases will lower administrative costs and thus benefit
both firms and tax administrations. Joint action against
tax loopholes and other means to evade taxes will be
beneficial as well, both in terms of fostering the rule of
law and to garner political support for a well-funded
public sector. As long as such benefits to tax coordina-
tion exist, the debate about the best way forward will
– and should – continue.
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